INTRODUCTION
Big-city sidewalk vendors have long hawked "Rolex" watches and "Donna Karan" t-shirts. In an upscale twist on the theme, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that "purse parties," in which hostesses sell knockoff designer goods to their friends, are a hot new trend, albeit with the potential downside of jail time.' Such counterfeits have become a huge business and a major challenge for law enforcement. At a Garment District warehouse in December 2003, New York police netted $1 million worth of counterfeit handbags purporting to be made by Louis Vuitton Malletier, Burberry Ltd., Chanel, Inc., and other luxury manufacturers.! For Coach, Inc., a maker of handbags and one of the standbys of the sidewalk scene and purse parties, the story is all too familiar: the company's goods turn up regularly in such stings. To the extent that they care about legal niceties, copycat manufacturers may be relying on the Supreme Court's 2001 observation that "in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products.... Allowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many instances. 4 Yet, the Court also carefully noted that copiers may not infringe recognized intellectual property rights. 5 Coach handbags, for example, are protected by federal statute and common law governing the use of trade dress, 6 a subset of trademark law that encompasses both product design and product packaging. The past several years have witnessed evolving legal standards for trade dress protection, offering the prospect of legal redress against the many-headed Hydra of the counterfeit industry. The Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers 7 was widely expected to fundamentally limit the extent of legal protections for trade dress. For product design, one category of trade dress, the picture indeed looked ominous: the Supreme Court stated that distinctiveness, one of the elements necessary to protect a valid trademark, could no longer be found "inherent," or automatic, for product design simply by virtue of its uniqueness . Instead, distinctiveness now requires proving that the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning, defined as a connection in consumers' minds between the product and its manufacturer. 9 To show secondary meaning, the trade dress owner must prove that the trade dress identifies the source of the product to consumers. 10 Immediately after the case, commentators lamented the "death knell" sounded by the Court for product design trademark owners. Observers feared that, without the possibility of claiming inherent distinctiveness, product design owners would have little legal protection for their marks because the new requirement of proving acquired distinctiveness was potentially onerous.
2 By narrowing the scope of trade dress protection in an effort to forestall anticompetitive strike suits, some argued, "Wal-Mart will likely benefit [the] consumer's interests since it promotes competition in the marketplace." 3 But for the counterfeit industry, Wal-Mart "could have the unfortunate effect of encouraging the practice of 'knock-offs,' especially in the fashion industry.'
4
While Wal-Mart deprived trade dress of automatic, or inherent, distinctiveness, TrafFix, decided by the Supreme Court a year later, increased the difficulty with which trade dress owners must demonstrate non-functionality.'
5 Although these two cases seemed to indicate that the Supreme Court had significantly raised the bar for product design protection, the Wal-Mart decision has not entirely stemmed the flow of product design claims, nor has it precluded trade dress owners from protecting their products from infringement. In fact, as I will discuss, several trade dress owners have recently adapted to the new requirements set out by Wal-Mart and prevailed against infringers.
This Comment examines recent product design case law to evaluate the effect of Wal-Mart on how secondary meaning can be shown by trade dress owners, identifies which types of trade dress claims are most likely to satisfy the secondary meaning requirement, and describes the growing rift among the circuits in the application of factors that are used to evaluate secondary meaning. This Comment then )). The Court further clarified that "a feature is also functional when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device." Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
argues that product design litigation since Wal-Mart reveals a growing gulf among the circuits' evidentiary requirements for proving secondary meaning. In time, it will be necessary for the Supreme Court to answer the question it posed, yet left unanswered, in Wal-Mart: "What must be shown to establish that a product's design is inherently distinctive for purposes of Lanham Act trade-dress protection?"1 6 Part I defines trade dress. Part II discusses the elements that must be shown to obtain Lanham Act protection for trade dress. Part III introduces Wal-Mart and the current state of the secondary meaning doctrine, and Part IV examines the effect of Wal-Mart on trade dress law. Part V discusses the factors that various circuits use to establish secondary meaning, and Part VI surveys recent trade dress litigation that illustrates the current state of the secondary meaning doctrine and indicates the direction in which trade dress litigation appears to be heading.
I. TRADE DRESS IN THE CONTEXT OF TRADEMARK LAW
According to a widely cited definition, trade dress "involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques."
7 Trade dress is a subset of trademark law and is also protected, whether registered or unregistered, by the Lanham Act. continues to be primarily judge-made in the federal courts. 2 As this Comment will argue, the common law evolution of trade dress law has led to significant variance in how courts define and protect trade dress, and occasionally, the Supreme Court has stepped in to referee.
Trade dress may be divided into two general categories: product packaging and product design. Samara had good reason to be sanguine about its chances to prevail against Wal-Mart. In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court had upheld the trademark rights of a chain of Mexican fast-food restaurants for trade dress described as "a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals."
48 Surely this set of characteristics was no more specific and persuasive a type of trade dress than the clearly defined elements of Samara's children's clothing. Moreover, in Two Pesos, the Court had made two key points on the issue of inherent distinctiveness. First, the Court found that the plaintiff, Two Pesos, Inc. had satisfied the distinctiveness requirement by having its trade dress classified as suggestive, arbitrary, or fancifulthe three categories of trademark that enjoy automatic inherent distinctiveness. 49 Relying on Two Pesos, Samara argued that its clothing designs should be "legally protected as distinctive trade dress for purposes of Section 43(a).
" " By so doing, Samara had hoped to satisfy the distinctiveness requirement by demonstrating that its mark was inherently distinctive, without having to present the additional evidence required to prove a secondary meaning analysis. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and found that Samara's clothing designs were more analogous to a trademarked color that "could eventually 'come to indicate a product's origin' ... [and] could be protected upon a showing of secondary meaning." The Court specifically rebutted Samara's efforts to analogize its situation to Two Pesos, in which the trade dress was found to be inherently distinctive:
Two Pesos unquestionably establishes the legal principle that trade dress can be inherently distinctive ... but it does not establish that poduct-design trade dress can be. Two Pesos is inapposite to our holding here because the trade dress at issue, the d6cor of a restaurant, seems to us not to constitute product design. It was either product packaging.., or else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no bearing on the present case. 54 Many commentators have criticized the peremptory nature of Wal-Mart's classification of Two Pesos' "festive" restaurant decor as product packaging and Samara's children's clothing as product fanciful, or suggestive. We need not determine which of these three categories properly characterizes the trade dress, because all three entitle Taco Cabana to protection without proof of secondary meaning." Taco Cabana Int'l, 932 F.2d at 1120 n.8. whether it was a 'common' basic shape or design, whether it was unique or unusual in a particular field, [and] whether it was a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods . . Finally, the Court stated that "given the unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based on alleged ,,60 inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle, since these trade dress owners could also seek patent or copyright protection for their designs. While this may be true, the Wal-Mart Court was also well aware that design owners would prefer trademark protection 61-which is perpetual, so long as the mark is in use-over patent 6 2 (twenty years from date of filing) or copyright protection 6 (life of author plus seventy years).
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAL-MART
Wal-Mart affected the law of product design trade dress in two ways. First, it clarified the distinctiveness requirement for trade dress. Second, it narrowed the scope of protection available and thereby created incentives for trade dress owners to argue that their marks are product packaging rather than product design. Contrary to initial fears expressed at the time of the decision, Wal-Mart does not stand for the proposition that trade dress cannot be protected. Instead, as in the cases discussed below, it has even assisted product design owners to prevail against infringers. Yet the decision has rightly been criticized for confusing as much as clarifying the issue.
A. Critique of Wal-Mart's New Distinctiveness Standard
Wal-Mart attempted to clarify the law of trade dress by finding that distinctiveness could be established for product design only through a showing of secondary meaning 64 Further, the Court maintained the test for secondary meaning that had been set forth in Inwood Laboratories. 65 Wal-Mart, therefore, was intended to be a straightforward solution to a troubling circuit split. In the period between the 1992 holding in Two Pesos and the 2000 decision in Wal-Mart, courts had found that product design could be inherently distinctive. The plaintiff simply could not have anticipated from the writ granting certiorari that secondary meaning would replace inherent distinctiveness as the central issue in the case.
A second criticism levied at Wal-Mart's efforts to clarify the law is that eliminating inherent distinctiveness essentially permits "competitors [to] freely copy unique designs early in the product's life, thus preventing the establishment of secondary meaning.
7 4 The case law examined in the next Section certainly bears this criticism out. In all the cases where secondary meaning was found, the product designs in question had been in use for years, if not decades, leaving unanswered the question of what a litigant launching a new product can or should do to protect its trade dress in a product design .
B. Narrowing the Scope of Trade Dress Protections
The two ways in which Wal-Mart has narrowed the scope of protection for trade dress are (1) it forced courts to distinguish between product packaging and product design, since their definitions are essential to applying the correct analysis for distinctiveness, and (2) it recommended that lower courts should be conservative in making this determination, thereby automatically limiting the number of products likely to earn the now-desirable distinction of product packaging over product design. Without explaining the need for such caution, the Wal-Mart decision merely stated that other courts should "err on the side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring secondary meaning.
These changes have led some commentators to point out that WalMart has introduced a new level of complexity into trade dress design, since the "application of different tests to packaging and design cases is impractical and unwarranted." 77 Another commentator observed that forcing a choice between product packaging and product design will again ultimately lead to a circuit split, since "lower courts again will develop conflicting tests. It is therefore possible that varying results will be seen on similar types of trade dress, depending on each circuit's test."
8
In Wal-Mart itself, the Court acknowledged the potential problems of forcing courts to distinguish product packaging from product design:
There will indeed be some hard cases at the margin: a classic glass CocaCola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for those consumers who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may constitute the product itself for those consumers who are bottle collectors, or part of the product itself for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass bottle, rather than a can, because they think it more stylish to drink from the former.
79
The Court did not attempt to solve this conundrum, stating only that it believed that "the frequency and the difficulty of having to distinguish between product design and product packaging will be much less than the frequency and the difficulty of having to decide when a product is inherently distinctive.
' " 8 0 Whether this has proven true is debatable. One could look at a trademark author's efforts to graphically clarify the confusion. In attempting to distinguish between "WalMart product design" and "Two Pesos trade dress," the author has placed restaurant and retail drcor squarely in the Two Pesos category of trade dress that could be found to be inherently distinctive.
8 '
However, a 2001 case in the Ninth Circuit belies such an easy characterization. In Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 82 the plaintiff owner of a chain of pool halls, sued a competitor for trade dress infringement for copying his halls' unique decor.1 3 While this fact pattern might seem reminiscent of Two Pesos, the similarities stop there because the court did not follow the Wal-Mart characterization of Two Pesos restaurant decor as product packaging or "some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging" 8 4 (either of which could be inherently distinctive). Instead, the Ninth Circuit turned without comment to a discussion of whether the pool hall decor had acquired secondary meaning-without discussing inherent distinctiveness at all. 85 The plaintiffs ultimately prevailed, but not without having to do the heavy evidentiary lifting needed to show secondary meaning, including introducing consumer surveys and extensive testimony evidence of copying. the court somewhat confusingly referred to the "design or dress" of the product, but applied the product design analysis of secondary meaning in any event.
92
Perhaps one exception to the general brevity on the product design-product packaging issue can be found in Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 93 in which the plaintiff argued (unsuccessfully) that the shelving, labels, and catalog, all "trappings associated with the sale of the candle," were either product packaging or a "tertium quid" analogous to product packaging. From these cases, it appears that Wal-Mart's instructions to err on the side of product design have had their effect not only in cases in which a single aspect of a product is in question, but also those in which, arguably, one of several elements might be found to be product packaging. Instead, the product design label has been attached to the whole combination.
V. THE SECONDARY MEANING FACTORS
The Wal-Mart Court narrowed the scope of protection for trade dress owners by holding that they were obliged to prove secondary meaning. The Court, however, did not explicitly state how secondary meaning was to be ascertained. 96 Determining secondary meaning is, as the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition explains, "a question of fact, with the burden of proof on the person claiming rights in the designation." 97 The Lanham Act does not use the phrase "secondary meaning," stating instead that such acquired product identification has occurred when a mark "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." 9 8 This distinctiveness is one of the requirements to prove likelihood of confusion for both a registered and unregistered trademark, without which there would be no protection available for trademarks or trade dress.9
Since the Lanham Act does not specify a statutory test, it has been left to the courts to define the kinds of evidence necessary to establish secondary meaning. In its discussion of distinctiveness and secondary meaning, Wal-Mart made no specific reference to the common law test for secondary meaning, ' The Second Circuit uses a somewhat modified version of the factors used in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, considering with approximately equal weight the following six factors:
(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage of the product, 
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1°7
The Second Circuit's test suggests a predilection for finding secondary meaning in products that have been successful in the marketplace and that have gained popular recognition in the press. The Second Circuit appears to be the only circuit to consider "unsolicited media coverage" as probative of secondary meaning.
18
In contrast to the other circuits, which favor six-or seven-factor tests, the Tenth Circuit cites a brief list of secondary meaning factors including "(1) a history of successful sales; (2) evidence of intentional copying[] . . . and (3) long use of the... trade dress."' 9 Yet the brevity of the list should not be taken to indicate that the Tenth Circuit is more permissive in its interpretation of secondary meaning requirements than other circuits. To the contrary, because this circuit applies a narrow interpretation to the few factors it does consider when making a determination of secondary meaning, the end result is that trade dress owners litigating in the Tenth Circuit may have a harder time proving secondary meaning than they would elsewhere.°O f the circuits that have engaged in a discussion of secondary meaning, the Ninth Circuit has taken perhaps the most lenient approach. The court found a "triable issue of fact" in a recent case in which only two types of evidence-survey evidence and proof of copying-were introduced to support a claim of secondary meaning."' Moreover, the court found that, "in appropriate circumstances, deliberate copying may suffice to support an inference of secondary mean- 
1997))
. 108 Id. As this review suggests, the evidentiary requirements to prove secondary meaning are highly court-specific; the factors that may be dispositive in one circuit will not necessarily prove persuasive in another. 1 1 3 But now that the Supreme Court has placed increased importance on secondary meaning, it may be necessary for the Court to create a unified evidentiary standard for how secondary meaning can be established. In the meantime, however, circuits continue using their own standards that, despite their variation, allow some product design owners to prove that their mark has acquired secondary meaning.
VI. SECONDARY MEANING IN ACTION: RECENT LITIGATION
Recent case law shows that, when courts apply the secondary meaning factors, outcomes are quite varied. In some cases, the protection accorded or denied to trade dress seems to follow predictably from the application of the secondary meaning test to the fact pattern; in other cases, the court seems to have made more of a stretch to achieve its results.
A. When Secondary Meaning Is Not Found
While this Comment highlights how some product design owners have successfully adapted to the more rigid requirements for secondary meaning since Wal-Mart, it would be misleading to suggest that most product design owners succeed. While I am not aware of any empirical studies quantifying the failure rate of product design cases since 2000, successful cases appear to be few and far between." 4 In recent cases in which trade dress owners have tried, and failed, to prove secondary meaning, the judicial opinions cite a variety of shortcomings. Two stand out in particular: poor evidence and a poor definition of the trade dress at issue. 114 For instance, of the four "successful" product design cases discussed in this Yankee Candle concerned a complaint brought by a manufacturer against a competitor for infringing its trade dress by copying a method of displaying the candles, the "overall 'look and feel' of Yankee's Housewarmer line of candles," and the layout of Yankee's catalog." 8 This is one of the few trade dress cases in which the plaintiff tried to circumvent the onerous secondary meaning test by asserting that its trade dress was product packaging."' Further, Yankee argued that, since each of the trade dress elements originated in "arbitrary" choices, its trade dress should be deemed inherently distinctive. The district court held that Yankee fell "far short" of the evidentiary requirements by failing to introduce any survey evidence, which the First Circuit terms the "'preferred' manner of demonstrating secondary meaning. substantial advertising outlays, sales figures demonstrating market success, and proof of intentional copying.
2
To the definite disadvantage of the product design owner in this case, the First Circuit applied the narrowest possible construction to both elements needed to show distinctiveness. First, finding that Yankee Candle's trade dress was on the border between product design and product packaging, the court applied Wal-Mart's default rule that resolves such doubt in favor of product design. Second, the court applied the secondary meaning factors and found that the lack of survey evidence was fatal to finding secondary meaning. In another case with a similar outcome, David White Instruments, LLC v. TLZ, Inc., 124 David White argued that TLZ had infringed on novel and non-functional aspects of its patent, particularly the product's physical appearance and design.' Essentially bypassing an analysis of the plaintiffs definition of its trade dress as either product S 126 design or product packaging, the court turned directly to an analysis of the secondary meaning factors: "direct consumer testimony, consumer surveys, length and manner of use, amount and manner of advertising, volume of sales, place in the market and proof of intentional copying."
127
Upon examining the evidence presented, the court found that the plaintiff failed, at least in part, on two of these factors. The plaintiff did not produce "any specific customer surveys" to substantiate its testimony that the David White product line enjoyed broad recognition among its customers,1 8 and its advertising "arguably" promoted "the functional features of the product as opposed to its distinctive trade dress." , 2 9
While David White did show evidence of substantial, longtime sales and revenues and a "long-standing reputation for 122 Id. at 44-45. 125 Id. at 43. 1 Id. at *7-8 (describing the trade dress features as "(1)the 'rounded-delta' level vial recess; (2) the raised semi-cylindrical midsection; (3) the proximal body member with a flat top, a flat bottom and rounded sides; and (4) the overall proportions and relationships of the components"). 126 Id. at *11-12. 127 Id. at *12 (quoting the original source of the factors, Spraying Systems Co. v Yankee Candle or David White might have had a very different reception in other, more lenient, circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, in which a trade dress claim was successful even though the plaintiff provided only a customer survey (admitted to be "of little or no value") and circumstantial evidence of copying to prove secondary meaning. 132 Clearly, the survey evidence requirement is inconsistently interpreted and applied across various circuits.
Failing to Define the Elements of Trade Dress:
Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc.
The Second Circuit in Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc.
13
3 failed to reach a detailed secondary meaning discussion because the court was dissatisfied with the plaintiffs definition of its trade dress. 34 Yurman Design, Inc., designed and manufactured jewelry with copyrighted designs, based on a common motif of twisted cables and gemstones.' The jewelry had been manufactured and widely distributed since 1982. 1 6 In 1998, PAJ, Inc., a competitor, began manufacturing copies of Yurman designs, and litigation for copyright and Lanham Act violations ensued.
37 Despite the jury's finding that "Yurman's trade dress was distinctive as to the jewelry's source, and that twenty PAJ bracelets, earrings, and rings infringed the trade dress because they were likely IM Id. 2001) (reconciling the weak customer survey with more persuasive circumstantial evidence). In contrast, in a Sixth Circuit case in which the owner had presented no survey evidence at all, the court stated that "[s]urvey evidence is not the only relevant evidence" to support a finding of secondary meaning for product design trade dress. 44 Given these parallel cases, it would be fair to surmise that the outcome of Yurrnan Design was due, at least in part, to poor advice from counsel in presenting the trade dress claim.
B. Successful Efforts to Prove Secondary Meaning
The cases discussed above illustrate the burden borne by product design owners, who must not only clearly state their trade dress by successfully describing visual objects in words, but must also present 138 Id. 139 Id. at 107. 140 Id. at 114. 141 Id. adequate evidence to prove to the courts that they have skirted the functionality minefield and have shown the clear link in consumers' minds between their product and its source. The outcomes in these and other cases show that this dual exercise is not always an easy one and that trade dress owners will often be disappointed.
Yet, as will be discussed in this Section, there are a few recent cases in which plaintiffs have successfully proven that the design elements of their products have acquired secondary meaning. Instead, Wal-Mart and TrafFix opened the door to a reexamination of secondary meaning that turned out favorably for Herman Miller-particularly because, unlike the First and Seventh Circuits,'°t he Sixth Circuit was willing to find secondary meaning in the absence of consumer surveys. 161 The court also gave a generous interpretation to the background secondary meaning requirement that the trade dress serve a source-identifying function: while the general public did not associate the Eames chair with its manufacturer, the fact that "the consuming public in modem furniture" was well aware that Herman Miller made the Eames chair was held sufficient to establish secondary meaning in the product design.
62
Herman Miller is a case in which the court applied a liberal interpretation of the secondary meaning factors, a process likely eased by the fact that the plaintiff had produced a deluge of evidence-the record contained more than five hundred pages.
16
This was clearly a case in which the plaintiffs had studied, and learned from, the failures of other trade dress litigants. 1' The Second Circuit held that the injunction, which had prevented We Care Trading Co. from selling all handbags made of "glove-tanned leather and bound infringer from copying any three of the following four design elements of Coach's "Classic Collection" handbags:
Defeating a Copycat
"glove-tanned leather, bound edges, heavy brass or nickel-plated brass hardware, and a rectangular handbag with a beaded chain."' 66 The district court relied on Wal-Mart to define secondary meaning.
1 67 The court also elaborated by quoting the Second Circuit's statement that "Is]econdary meaning existing where 'the public is moved in any degree to buy an article because of its source.'""6 To determine whether secondary meaning exists in the case of Coach handbags, the court applied six factors, a non-exhaustive list including "(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage of the product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark's use., 169 The court found that Coach had presented evidence to satisfy all six of these factors and was particularly persuaded by findings that the plaintiff had produced extensive customer surveys; that Coach had spent millions marketing its bags, which had been on the market for nearly forty years; and that its products had been plagiarized to the tune of 200,000 handbags a year, including some handbags manufactured by the defendant itself.
70
The defendant's attempts to defeat the trade dress by showing that one or more of the protectable elements were functional did not succeed. Instead, the court stated that "[t]he TrafFix decision does not overrule Second Circuit law that a collection of functional features may nonetheless be protectable trade dress. In Coach, the Second Circuit's analysis was favorable to the plaintiff in one significant respect: the court was willing to accept a succinct description of the trade dress-far shorter and less detailed than edges," was overbroad and added the requirement that the forbidden handbags also have "either the distinctive Coach hardware or its tag." Id. at *14. The trade dress in dispute involved the packaging of a hair care product marketed by Sally Beauty. Specifically, the case involved the use of a bullet-shaped, white bottle with a flat, black cap; text on the product's label; and very similar product names.
In its approach to the trade dress infringement claim, the court did not sever the color and shape of the bottle from the labeling; it simply considered the "total look" of the product. This analysis differs in procedure from Wal-Mart's approach to a product design case, which would automatically assume that the product design is descriptive and, therefore, require proof of secondary meaning.1 3 Instead, the court employed Wal-Mart's approach to product packaging and first determined whether the trade dress was descriptive. Once the court concluded that the trade dress was descriptive, it then required a showing of sec-S 184 ondary meaning.
To prove secondary meaning, Sally Beauty argued that it had "(1) a history of successful sales; (2) evidence of intentional copying by Beautyco; and (3) long use of the Sally Beauty trade dress. ' In Clicks Billiards, 9 the owner of a chain of pool halls complained that a competitor had allegedly copied the d~cor of his establishments. The circuit court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment, in part, based on the trade dress issue.
9 ' In the secondary meaning discussion, the court focused its attention on just two particular types of evidence introduced by Clicks Billiards, Inc.: a customer survey'9 and evidence of deliberate copying.1
92
Neither of these factors was without controversy at the district court level. The trial court found that the "survey is not without flaws," and "[p]ut bluntly, the survey is of little or no value" because the respondents offered vague responses to follow-up questions.
19 3 On appeal, the circuit court, found that since the lower court had admitted the survey rather than excluding it as impermissibly flawed, "the survey admitted by the district court raises questions of material fact with respect to secondary meaning that may not be disposed of by the court alone."0 94 Therefore, these were matters to be decided by ajury, which precluded a finding of summary judgment against Clicks Billiards.'
95
The plaintiff got similarly favorable treatment by the court of appeals on the issue of evidence of copying. The district court had found that testimony and affidavits suggesting that Sixshooters, Inc.'s owners had visited Clicks Billiards on numerous occasions and had 8 See supra notes 115-122 and accompanying text (describing the First Circuit's analysis of the lack of secondary meaning owing to the plaintiff's failure to produce consumer surveys).
" even measured the fixtures in Clicks was, in total, "slight" and "contested.' 96 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that such an evaluation precluded a finding of summary judgment, since "the district court is prohibited from weighing evidence and deciding issues of contested fact."' 97 Aside from this evidence of intentional copying and the consumer survey results, however, the Ninth Circuit did not demand a further showing of other factors tending to support a finding of secondary meaning.
CONCLUSION
To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of product design trade dress claims have been greatly exaggerated.
98 Though, as we have seen, cases in which product design owners succeeded in proving secondary meaning may be few in number, their very existence confirms what one observer stated in regard to Herman Miller: "Although product design trade dress claims may be on life support, this case shows they're not totally dead yet. The nature of the products at issue in the "successful" cases may give some indication of factors likely to persuade to a court considering secondary meaning. For instance, the products protected in Herman Miller and Coach are exclusive, highly marketed, and broadly recognized. These characteristics place such products in a privileged position with respect to proving secondary meaning. Indeed, in an article discussing the litigation, the Coach attorney observed that dicta in a 2000 decision involving the French luxury accessory manufacturer Hermes, Int'l "paved the way for the affirmance received by Coach for its handbags," since the Hermes court "noted that plaintiff's heavily marketed handbags 'continue to indicate their source.' 2 0 0 Similarly, watch and jewelry manufacturer Cartier won a preliminary injunction against a manufacturer who had copied its Pasha and Grille design Wal-Mart asserted that pleading inherent distinctiveness is "not worth the candle., 2 0 9 After Wal-Mart eliminated inherent distinctiveness for product design cases, the action now has turned to whether, and how, trade dress owners can meet the sometimes substantial evidentiary burden of proving that the design has acquired the necessary secondary meaning to show distinctiveness.
The broader policy question raised by this shift is the degree to which the courts can or will protect the product designs of new market entrants. Secondary meaning tests, in all their various guises, favor established players, since in every case the purpose of the secondary meaning inquiry is to determine whether the trade dress serves a source-identifying function. The Supreme Court argued against an inherent-distinctiveness test in Wal-Mart partly because such a test could hurt new entrants by making them vulnerable to strike suits. 
